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ABSTRACT 
  That childhood obesity is an alarming public health problem is 
clear and widely appreciated. What is altogether unclear is what our 
society should do about it. Some people think the solution lies in 
using tort law to sue McDonald’s, Coca-Cola, and other corporations. 
We reject that notion. Others believe that government should order 
specific changes in the behavior of food companies and school 
officials—and yet, there is little reason for confidence that these 
“command and control” strategies will make a difference. 
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  Instead, we propose “performance-based regulation” of the food 
industry. This is analogous to the approach our country is now taking 
with respect to elementary and secondary education (most 
prominently in the No Child Left Behind legislation). Schools are not 
told how to achieve better educational results, but better outcomes are 
demanded of them. This strategy has also been used in the 
environmental context to reduce harmful power plant emissions, and 
it has been briefly proposed as a way of regulating cigarette 
companies. 
  In this Article, we propose that large firms selling food and drink 
that is high in sugar or fat will be assigned the responsibility of 
reducing obesity rates in a specific pool of children. A firm’s share of 
the overall responsibility will be based on its share of the “bad” food 
market, and the children assigned to it will be organized by 
geographically proximate schools where obesity rates are currently 
above the plan’s nationwide target rate of 8 percent (the actual 
childhood obesity rate today is approximately 16 percent). Firms that 
fail to achieve their goals will be subject to serious financial penalties. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In America, obesity1 is a health problem that many classify as an 
epidemic.2 Particularly troubling is the level of obesity among 
children, which has tripled over the last thirty years.3 That this 
problem has escalated to a point requiring action is a fairly 
uncontroversial notion. People, however, disagree about what form 
the solution should take, and the positions fill a spectrum. 
 
 1. “Scientists categorize a person as ‘overweight’ if they have a Body Mass Index (‘BMI’) 
greater than 25 kg/m2, and as ‘obese’ if they have a BMI greater than or equal to 30 kg/m2.” 
Adam Benforado et al., Broken Scales: Obesity and Justice in America, 53 EMORY L.J. 1645, 
1648 n.3 (2004). With respect to children, 
The [Institute of Medicine] defines obesity . . . as those having a body mass index [sic] 
(BMI) equal to or greater than the 95th percentile of the age- and gender-specific 
BMI charts developed by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC); at 
risk for obesity is defined as having a BMI between 85th and 95th percentiles. CDC 
chose not to include the NHANES III (1988–1994) body weight data in the revised 
year 2000 BMI standards for children aged 6 years or older, as these data would have 
shifted the BMI curves upwards, erroneously conveying appropriateness to the higher 
weights. The CDC uses the terms overweight and at risk for overweight for children 
according to the same cut-off points. 
Eileen Salinsky, Effects of Food Marketing to Kids: I’m Lovin’ It?, ISSUE BRIEF NO. 814 (Nat’l 
Health Policy Forum), 2006, at 3, available at http://www.nhpf.org/pdfs_ib/IB814_ 
FoodMarketing_08-15-06.pdf. 
 2. In fact, by 1999 the Centers for Disease Control had already termed America’s issue 
with obesity to be an epidemic. Obesity Epidemic Increases Dramatically in the United States: 
CDC Director Calls for National Prevention Effort, UPDATE (Ctr. Disease Control, Atlanta, 
Ga.), Oct. 26, 1999, available at http://www.cdc.gov/od/oc/media/pressrel/r991026.htm (“A 
growing obesity epidemic is threatening the health of millions of Americans in the United 
States.”). 
 3. Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1649; Progress in Preventing Childhood Obesity: How 
Do We Measure Up?, REP. BRIEF (Inst. of Med.), Sept. 2006, at 1, available at http://www.iom. 
edu/Object.File/Master/36/984/11722_reportbrief.pdf (“Over the past 30 years, the obesity rate 
has nearly tripled for children ages 2–5 years (from 5 to 14 percent) and youth ages 12–19 years 
(from 5 to 17 percent), and quadrupled for children ages 6–11 years (from 4 to 19 percent).”). 
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Many people firmly believe the answer lies with parental 
accountability.4 Some in this camp hold to the idea that parents have 
an obligation to take control of their own children’s health, and that 
society should not use government to interfere with (and perhaps 
even undermine) that responsibility.5 To the extent that parents are 
now understood to be failing their children, this viewpoint argues for 
reliance on decentralized societal forces to nudge parents to better 
perform their duty: pressures from extended family members and 
friends, changes in the food and exercise markets, and changed social 
norms about obesity that may well arise in response to increased 
public awareness of the problem.6 Others in the inaction camp simply 
conclude that no proposed official interventions will make things any 
better, that they all are likely to cost a lot, and that, because of 
unanticipated consequences, some could potentially make matters 
worse.7 
Although others think that the government should indeed play a 
role, they think that it has played the wrong role so far. They do not 
like the way agricultural food subsidies work (promoting the 
production of high fructose corn syrup, for example);8 they do not like 
the way children are fed through the national school lunch program;9 
they do not like the political clout that agribusiness has with 
 
 4. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Obesity Policy Choices: What (Not) to Do About Obesity: 
A Moderate Aristotelian Answer, 93 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1366 (2005) (“As one might expect, the 
causes and consequences of obesity are not a matter of settled and undisputed truth. In light of 
that uncertainty, we should be very skeptical of any effort to solve this matter by government 
intervention, whether in the form of regulation, taxes, or liability rules.”). 
 5. See id. 
 6. See Jeffrey P. Koplan, Preface to INST. OF MED., PROGRESS IN PREVENTING 
CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HOW DO WE MEASURE UP? xi, xi (2006) (“Preventing childhood 
obesity will involve changes in social norms . . . .”). 
 7. See generally Paul Campos, The Legalization of Fat: Law, Science and the Construction 
of a Moral Panic (Univ. of Colo. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-
16, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=902693 (arguing that there is not sufficient 
scientific evidence that weight loss strategies significantly improve health). 
 8. See generally Josh Miner, Market Incentives Could Bring U.S. Agriculture and Nutrition 
Policies into Accord, 60 CAL. AGRIC. 8 (2006), available at http://calag.ucop.edu/0601JFM/pdfs/ 
AgPolicy.pdf (proposing that the USDA promote healthful eating by cutting back on 
commodity support payments—for instance, those that subsidize corn, which is grown largely to 
produce high-fructose corn syrup—and diverting those funds into food stamp programs that 
would facilitate the purchase of minimally processed fruits, vegetables, and whole grain 
products). 
 9. See Michele Simon, Money, Politics, Garbage, and School Lunch (August 25, 1998), 
available at http://www.pacificnews.org/jinn/stories/4.17/980825-lunch.html (last visited April 14, 
2007). 
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regulatory agencies like the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA);10 and more. 
For those in this camp, perhaps the most important first step would 
be for government to quit doing the bad things it now does. 
Yet, many have concluded that government has an affirmative 
role to play with respect to childhood obesity,11 although they are very 
much divided over what that should be. For example, after 
acknowledging the human frailties of parents and their children, some 
urge government to make efforts to inform the public about healthy 
eating and healthy activities.12 But, they argue, governmental action 
going beyond the informational and educational functions would be 
too oppressive.13 
Others are looking for a much more robust governmental 
response.14 They question the effectiveness of measures such as 
calorie disclosures at fast-food restaurants, better labels on grocery 
store products, nutrition education in public schools, and the like.15 
They do not necessarily oppose requiring such measures, but rather 
they predict that these devices will be inadequate to solve the 
problem.16 We believe this concern is compelling, given mounting 
evidence that our food choices are not truly our own and are likely to 
remain that way as long as we live in a world of food advertising, 
promotion, and increased portion size. 
 
 10. E.g., Jess Alderman & Richard A. Daynard, Applying Lessons from Tobacco Litigation 
to Obesity Lawsuits, 30 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 82, 84 (2006) (“Food companies are a 
powerful lobby in Washington, make campaign contributions, and actively seek to influence 
food and nutrition professionals by funding their research or hiring them as consultants. Food 
company executives and [USDA] officials often have close relationships, and in some cases, 
they switch roles over time.”). 
 11. See, e.g, M. Gregg Bloche, Obesity and the Struggle Within Ourselves, 93 GEO. L.J. 
1335, 1351–58 (2005). 
 12. See, e.g., id. at 1353–54 (“[P]ublic health authorities ought to bring their credibility and 
resources to the task of transforming public understanding of food and fitness matters.”). 
 13. See, e.g., id. at 1338 (“[Government command and control intervention] is at odds with 
our core beliefs and unlikely to produce public health success.”). 
 14. See, e.g., Benforado et al., supra note 1, at 1723 (“As misgivings [about the food 
industry] grew and individuals began to take seriously the possibility that fast food was 
exercising more influence over our consumption habits than we had realized, an idea was born: 
force the industry to change, whether through regulation or lawsuits.”). 
 15. See, e.g., id. at 1675–89 (arguing that food companies are able to manipulate external 
psychological cues that cause unhealthy eating decisions even where good information is 
provided to consumers). 
 16. See, e.g., id. at 1791 (“Labeling regulations likely serve a palliative function, but they do 
not get to the root of the problem . . . .”). 
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This concern leads advocates to call for stricter regulatory 
intervention.17 Some examples of proposed action are (1) eliminating 
certain food items from school vending machines;18 (2) requiring 
schools and workplaces to include healthier menu items;19 (3) sharply 
restricting the inclusion of trans fats in foods prepared by food service 
establishments;20 (4) limiting the density of fast-food restaurants near 
facilities where children gather;21 (5) forbidding the retail sale of 
certain junk food to children;22 (6) eliminating the advertising of sweet 
or high fat foods in connection with children’s television programs;23 
(7) upgrading school lunches so that they are healthier;24 (8) requiring 
cities to subsidize grocery stores that sell fresh fruits and vegetables in 
 
 17. For a recent summary of a wide range of potential government interventions to attack 
the obesity problem, see generally Lawrence O. Gostin, Law as a Tool to Facilitate Healthier 
Lifestyles and Prevent Obesity, 297 JAMA 87 (2007). Most of the ideas that Gostin discusses are 
command-and-control strategies. 
 18. Michelle M. Mello et al., Obesity—The New Frontier of Public Health Law, 354 NEW 
ENG. J. MED. 2601, 2603 (2006) (“The policies of school districts have been criticized for 
contributing to what researchers describe as a ‘toxic environment’ for children: about 60 percent 
of U.S. middle schools and high schools sell soft drinks from vending machines on campus, 
although this is likely to change under guidelines recently established by the beverage industry 
to curtail such sales by 2010.”) (citations omitted). 
 19. Gostin, supra note 17, at 87–88. 
 20. New York City recently enacted a regime that prohibits restaurants from preparing 
food with more than a minimal amount of trans fat. Notice from the N.Y. Board of Health on 
the Adoption of an Amendment (§ 81.08) to Article 81 of the New York City Health Code 
(Dec. 5, 2006), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/notice-adoption-
hc-art81-08.pdf. 
 21. See James F. Sallis & Karen Glanz, The Role of Built Environments in Physical Activity, 
Eating, and Obesity in Childhood, FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 2006, at 89, 97. 
 22. Banning the sale of junk food near schools would facilitate restrictions of advertising 
near schools because the regulated commercial speech would no longer concern lawful activity. 
See Randolph Kline et al., Beyond Advertising Controls: Influencing Junk-Food Marketing and 
Consumption with Policy Innovations Developed in Tobacco Control, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 603, 
611–13 (2006) (“If a product cannot be lawfully sold, then the First Amendment, via Central 
Hudson, does not protect the advertising of the product.”). 
 23. See Lee J. Munger, Comment, Is Ronald McDonald the Next Joe Camel? Regulating 
Fast Food Advertisements Targeting Children in Light of the American Overweight and Obesity 
Epidemic, 3 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 456, 457–58 (2004); see also Mello et al., supra note 18, at 2605 
(“[T]here would be less difficulty today in establishing an association between food advertising 
and children’s eating habits and obesity.”). Indeed, “[t]he results of recent opinion polls indicate 
that a majority of Americans believe that the government should be involved in fighting obesity, 
particularly by regulating the marketing of ‘junk foods’ to children.” Mello et al., supra note 18, 
at 2602 (citations omitted). 
 24. See generally Simone A. French, Pricing Effects on Food Choices, 133 J. NUTRITION 
841S, 843S (2003) (proposing that schools encourage healthier lunch choices by raising the 
prices of high-fat foods and lowering the prices of low-fat foods). 
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low income areas;25 (9) assuring all children safe access to parks and 
bicycle paths;26 and (10) requiring schools to increase the duration and 
intensity of physical education.27 
What we want to emphasize is that, by and large, these 
recommendations are for what we would term “command-and-
control” regulation. Proposals like these rest on the belief that 
professional public health experts know how the regulated parties 
should behave, and so the point of regulation is both to spell out that 
behavior and enforce effectively the specified obligations. 
We should also mention here that other advocates believe the 
solution to childhood obesity, at least initially, lies in courtrooms 
rather than legislatures or regulatory agencies. These advocates 
would like to see already-obese plaintiffs have access to courts 
through a novel cause of action sounding in negligence or products 
liability.28 
We count ourselves among those who seek government action, 
but we are not proposing the command-and-control approach, and we 
are not keen on litigation29 or other possible interventions as the 
solution. Instead, we believe that a system of performance-based 
regulation (PBR) holds greater promise for dealing with the obesity 
crisis by imposing duties on the food and beverage industry that 
contain an appropriate balance of firmness and flexibility. 
In this Article we lay out in detail a scheme of performance-
based regulation as a way of combating America’s childhood obesity 
problem. In a nutshell, our proposal assigns large firms that sell food 
or drink containing high levels of sugar or fat the responsibility for 
 
 25. LISA M. FELDSTEIN ET AL., CAL. DEP’T HEALTH SERVS., ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
AND REDEVELOPMENT: A TOOLKIT ON LAND USE AND HEALTH 4-9 to -11 (2006), available at 
http://healthyplanning.org/ecdev_toolkit/EcDevToolkit.pdf. 
 26. See generally John J. Librett et al., Local Ordinances that Promote Physical Activity: A 
Survey of Municipal Policies, 93 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1399 (2003) (discussing local policies 
affecting both children and adults). 
 27. See generally Andrew Smith & Stephen Bird, From Evidence to Policy: Reflections on 
Emerging Themes in Health-Enhancing Physical Activity, 22 J. SPORTS SCI. 791, 796–97 (2004) 
(arguing for a physical education curriculum to encourage physically active modes of 
transportation). 
 28. See Samuel J. Romero, Comment, Obesity Liability: A Super-Sized Problem or a Small 
Fry in the Inevitable Development of Product Liability?, 7 CHAP. L. REV. 239, 277–78 (2004). 
“At times the mere threat of litigation is enough to induce an industry to change its ways.” 
Alderman & Daynard, supra note 10, at 85. Some researchers, however, believe “it is not likely 
that food personal injury cases would be successful at this time.” Id. at 86. 
 29. See infra Part III. 
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reducing obesity rates in a specific pool of children. The basis for a 
firm’s share of the overall responsibility will be its share of the “bad” 
food market, and the children assigned to it will be organized by 
geographically proximate schools where obesity rates are above the 
plan’s nationwide target rate of 8 percent. Participating firms will 
have ten years to reduce the obesity rate in their assigned schools by 
more than 50 percent, and will face substantial penalties starting at 
the end of the fifth year if they fail to meet the regulatory goals. 
Part I of this Article explains PBR as a regulatory strategy and 
compares it with a range of other approaches to the childhood obesity 
issue. Part II justifies the application of PBR to the food industry. 
Part III argues the superiority of PBR over tort law for dealing with 
childhood obesity. Part IV then lays out our proposal in detail. Parts 
V and VI respectively discuss the politics entailed in implementing 
the plan and the compliance strategies firms would likely adopt. 
Finally, Part VII highlights alternative PBR strategies for combating 
obesity. 
We concede at the outset that more data would permit us to 
improve features of our plan, and we imagine there will be disputes 
over the plan’s precise parameters even among those who favor our 
approach. But we consider it essential to specify our proposal in some 
detail because we have found that when we briefly present the idea, 
most people instinctively conclude that it is impractical, whatever its 
theoretical attractiveness, its moral force, or its political prospects. 
(Although some estimate the latter to be close to zero currently, this 
does not trouble us for now, as we are only at the point of launching 
our idea into the policy arena.) 
I.  ABOUT PERFORMANCE-BASED REGULATION 
A. Compared with Command-and-Control Regulation 
To better explain what we mean by PBR, we will first contrast it 
with command-and-control regulation. Suppose that the regulator 
aims to address the amount of pollution in the air. With command-
and-control regulation, it might direct factories to install certain filters 
on their pipes that spew pollutants into the atmosphere—filters that 
the regulator believes will best reduce the factory’s contribution to air 
pollution levels. In deciding what remedial measure(s) to order, 
regulators are likely not only to take into account the cost of the new 
filters and their effectiveness, but also to compare that choice with 
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other options, such as ordering the factory to use different fuels or to 
alter the ingredients it uses in production. In the end, the regulator 
tries to order the socially optimal solution, all things considered. 
Similarly, in the arena of worker health and safety, a regulator 
could require a factory to make all of its employees wear face masks 
for certain tasks, in the hopes of best reducing the incidence of 
respiratory disease. Again, the regulator might have considered 
requiring certain air ventilation systems at the workplace or 
precluding the use of certain chemicals in making some products. The 
assumption underlying such a regulatory scheme is that the expert 
regulators can determine the optimal solution to the problem at hand 
and then order the relevant actors to comply. 
Within the context of childhood obesity, one frequently touted 
command-and-control example is a ban on the sale of sweetened 
beverages in public schools, based on expert determination that this 
supply-curtailment strategy would reduce obesity rates.30 
By contrast, PBR does not tell the relevant actors how to behave 
in solving the problem. It does not order enterprises to force their 
workers to use masks or to put filters of a certain sort on their 
smokestacks (or to pull their Cokes and Pepsis from school cafeterias 
and vending machines). Instead, PBR tells a firm or industry what its 
outputs or results should be with regard to a certain problem. Then, 
the regulated party itself has the responsibility of figuring out how 
best to achieve the required performance. In the environmental 
regulation scenario, for example, a factory might be told to reduce its 
emission rate of a certain pollutant to X parts per billion. It would 
then have to determine how to best effectuate this outcome. It might 
add filters, or it might do something else. Similarly, in the worker-
safety example, a factory might be required to reduce the incidence of 
respiratory diseases to a certain level. Perhaps face masks are the 
right solution, but the factory would be free to solve the problem 
using other strategies, including changing the materials with which 
workers come into contact or reducing the number of hours each 
worker is exposed to the materials. So, too, as we will explain in 
 
 30. Judge Richard Posner supports antiobesity measures aimed at reducing consumption of 
soft drinks by children, as “[s]oft drinks have virtually no nutritional content (unlike foods rich 
in cream or butter), and recent studies indicate that they are a significant factor in obesity . . . .” 
Richard Posner, The Fat Tax—Posner’s Comment, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOG, Oct. 8, 2006, 
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2006/10/the_fat_taxposn.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2007). 
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detail,31 applying PBR to childhood obesity would mean, under our 
proposal, ordering the food and beverage industry to take steps to 
reduce obesity prevalence rates, but leaving it up to them to figure 
out the best way of achieving that outcome. 
The central justification underlying PBR is that when 
government regulators use command-and-control regulation, they too 
often make the wrong choice. They select a solution that is more 
costly than necessary or one that is less effective than another. They 
often order yesterday’s technology instead of tomorrow’s. 
Government frequently imposes nonoptimal regulatory requirements 
because the relevant regulator all too often is neither sufficiently 
informed about current alternatives nor the right party to work out, 
or even be on top of, more effective solutions in the future. By 
contrast, PBR counts on the idea that the regulated party can either 
use its repository of information and experience, or draw on that of 
others, to develop the cheapest, most efficient, and most effective way 
to accomplish the regulator’s goal. 
But PBR does not merely lie back and wait for the market to 
bring about the socially desired change. Instead, PBR selects the 
party it thinks is responsible for the problem and well situated to 
solve it, and then imposes on that party the obligation to do so. PBR 
is not simple. It requires deciding who the appropriate subject of 
regulation is and what level of performance is necessary. On top of 
that, it is also necessary to figure out how to measure compliance and 
what penalties to impose for noncompliance. Yet, most of these 
elements are broadly similar to the requirements of command-and-
control regulation. There, too, the regulator has to decide, for 
example, which polluters to target, what to order them to change, 
how to decide whether they have done so, and what to do about it if 
they have not. Hence, although some aspects of the regulatory 
process may be more problematic than others depending upon the 
approach, the central difference is best captured by the distinction 
between regulating inputs and outcomes. 
B. Compared with Participatory Regulation 
PBR and command-and-control regulation are by no means the 
only strategies available to regulators. For example, a quite different 
 
 31. See infra Part IV. 
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regulatory strategy rests on the notion of participation.32 Here, the 
regulator requires participation in an industry’s decisionmaking by 
those directly affected by it. For example, workers themselves might 
have a voice in deciding how to enhance worker safety at a specific 
enterprise. In the case of environmental regulation, the individuals 
living in the surrounding community might have input into how the 
factory deals with the pollution problem.33 And in the childhood 
obesity area, food and beverage companies might be required to meet 
and confer with consumer advocates for public health regarding the 
ingredients in their products, the way they are marketed, and the way 
the public is informed about their healthy or unhealthy attributes. 
Under this approach, the regulator tells firms neither what they 
must achieve nor how they are to do things. Instead, the regulator 
requires the firms to open themselves up to input from parties—other 
than the regulator—who may be harmed by the firms’ activities and 
whose interests the regulator is seeking to further. This is a “process” 
solution, and the justification underlying it is that by giving voice to 
the social interests at stake, the regulated enterprises will become 
more socially responsible. 
As with PBR, this approach is based on the belief that the 
regulator alone cannot determine the socially correct solution, either 
for the reasons already given, or because there are values at stake 
that the regulator cannot sensibly weigh. 
Of course, the way any participatory solution plays out might 
well turn on precisely the form the required participation takes. Must 
the firm only listen to the participants? In precisely what forums must 
the participants be heard? Who decides who the participants are? 
What leverage points are the participants given to press an industry to 
act upon their views? 
Obviously, a recognized labor union operating under a collective 
bargaining agreement might well be more effective in promoting 
worker safety through its members’ participation in the firm’s safety 
program than might a firm-appointed committee with no powers to 
 
 32. See, e.g., Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The Governance 
of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1104–15 (2005) (discussing participatory 
regulation of workplace safety). 
 33. See generally Charles F. Sabel et al., Beyond Backyard Environmentalism: How 
Communities Are Quietly Refashioning Environmental Regulation, 24 BOSTON REV. 4 (1999) 
(proposing greater local community input in the environmental regulatory process through a 
“rolling-rule” regime). 
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call a strike if needed. But participants do not necessarily need to 
have that sort of union power, at least if they are able to mobilize, 
say, worker and public opinion on behalf of their position. 
Other forms of participant leverage are also imaginable. 
Consider, for example, the role of so-called “outside directors” on 
corporate boards of directors. Today’s “outside directors” are mainly 
viewed as having the duty to prevent director and executive self-
dealing to the detriment of shareholders, and to ensure that executive 
compensation is not extraordinarily excessive. But one could at least 
imagine an outside director, or several, with the obligation to look out 
for interests of other constituents, including workers, consumers, and 
third parties impacted by enterprise externalities. 
For now, our point is only to contrast the underlying assumptions 
of participation and PBR. With PBR, outcomes are specified, not 
processes. Maybe firms subject to PBR will choose to create their 
own participatory structure, at least if they think that will help them 
better achieve their outcome target. But that is a decision for the 
regulated party to make. 
C. Compared with Management-Based Regulation 
Next, we wish to note another method of regulation, termed 
“management-based.” We view this as a different sort of “process” 
regulation. Under this approach, the regulated firms or industries are 
merely required to design proposals for solving the identified 
problems, and then to implement those proposals.34 Unlike PBR, the 
regulator does not specify the level of improvement; nor does the 
regulator dictate the nature of the solution, as would be the case in 
command-and-control regulation. 
Management-based regulation is a kind of “soft law” that 
demands participation of a different sort. Here, either single firms or 
groups of them must work with the regulator, putting forward their 
way to attack the social problem identified by the regulator.35 For 
 
 34. Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing Private 
Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 694 (2003). 
 35. Although not strictly “management-based,” some people favor the strategy of self-
regulation. For example, one article observes: 
[T]he success of government regulation of the food industry will probably fall short of 
what industry could accomplish alone if it were strongly motivated to do so. Efforts to 
encourage self-regulation and corporate responsibility could go far toward improving 
the healthfulness of foods sold, provided the industry responses heed the limits of 
antitrust law and do not displace meaningful external regulation. 
